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Addressing the Divisions in Antitrust Policy
Herbert Hovenkamp*
This is the text of an interview conducted in writing by Professor A.
Douglas Melamed, Stanford Law School. Reprinted by permission,
Concurrences Review (Nov. 15, 2021). My thanks to Doug and to
Concurrences Review. I am solely responsible for the responses.

How did it all begin? Or, to be more precise, how did you come to
be an antitrust scholar, and how did you come to be a coauthor,
and ultimately the author, of the treatise?
In the late 1970s I was a fresh PhD teaching history at the University
of Texas. My boss, the late William H. Goetzmann, asked me to
teach legal history and I agreed if I could attend some law school
classes. I completed law school and was inspired by two strong but
very different antitrust teachers, Lino Graglia and Richard Markovits.
I met Phil Areeda in 1980 while I was on a postdoc at Harvard Law
School. In 1983, when I was a tenure-track professor at Hastings,
Areeda asked me to join him. He had split up with Donald Turner
after they completed the first five volumes of the Antitrust Law
treatise. In 1990 Phil was diagnosed with leukemia. He died in Dec.,
1995, as we were working on volume 10. After that, I finished the
treatise myself, although I have had coauthors. John Solow worked
on market power and Einer Elhauge on tying in the first edition. For
the past several years Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durance,
two distinguished economists, have worked on damages and expert
testimony. The fourth edition of the treatise, now 22 volumes, was
completed in 2019 and I have begun the fifth edition.
Have you taken any position on antitrust law that you now regret
or think was mistaken?
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Not many. I believe my views seem more pro-enforcement in relation
to the federal courts than they were two decades ago. That occurred
mainly because the court moved right, however, not because I moved
left.
One area where I should have been more circumspect is the idea that
we should assess exclusionary practices by reference to a
hypothetical “equally efficient rival.” That is a complex concept
because it has both an administrative and a substantive component.
Administratively, the concept of the “equally efficient rival” in areas
such as predatory pricing or exclusive dealing is valuable because it
creates a baseline—namely, the dominant firm’s costs. An equally
efficient rival has the same costs as the defendant has. This
framework drives the Areeda–Turner rule for exclusionary pricing.
As a matter of substance, however, the equally efficient rival
predicate is excessively underdeterrent. Competitive markets contain
firms with different costs. The costs of the marginal firm may be
significantly higher than those of the dominant firm. Nevertheless,
these less efficient firms are essential to competition. This was one
thing that made the Stigler/Chicago School definition of entry
barriers so perverse. It effectively punished new firms who had
smaller scale or scope by finding that entry barriers were lacking.
Fortunately, the courts have largely rejected it.
Sadly, most efforts to protect less efficient rivals, through such
devices as pursuing above-cost predatory pricing, deteriorate into
questions about intent. That is not a satisfactory resolution,
particularly not in jury trials. High on antitrust’s agenda should be
reformulation of sensible antitrust rules so as to protect less efficient
but nevertheless important rivals. We may need to maintain the
concept for pricing cases but jettison it in other areas.

________________________________________
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“UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW NEEDS TO ESCAPE
FROM AN “ERROR COST” ANTI-ENFORCEMENT BIAS
THAT WAS ALREADY OBSOLETE WHEN IT WAS
ARTICULATED” AND “HAS BECOME A SOCIALLY
COSTLY FORM OF SPECIAL INTEREST CAPTURE.”
________________________________________
What are the biggest issues facing antitrust law today?
United States antitrust law needs to escape from an “error cost” antienforcement bias that was already obsolete when it was articulated in
the twentieth century. The bias was built on the idea that markets
work themselves pure and correct monopoly more quickly than
courts correct judicial errors of overenforcement. It initially
performed a useful function because so much of antitrust at the time
was excessive. That time has long since passed. An empirical
revolution in industrial economics that began in the 1970s and 1980s
has thoroughly exploded the error cost view. Today it receives
business support because it preaches reduced liability. It has become
a socially costly form of special interest capture. Current case law
reflects the bias in harsh pro-defendant standards for motions to
dismiss and summary judgment, an underdeterrent merger policy,
and a rule of reason that has become almost useless because it
ignores fairly simple decision procedures.
Antitrust has become something of a piñata for folks outside the
antitrust mainstream. It is criticized by the New Brandeisians on the
left, largely for noneconomic reasons, and by those on the right who
think it’s too focused on static analysis and gives short shrift to
dynamic analysis and thus to innovation. What should antitrust law
learn from these critics ?
We can learn from both, but often by negative example. Today both
the antitrust right and the antitrust left are nostalgic for the past,
although for different parts of it. The right is still stuck in the heyday
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of neoliberalism, the Mont Pelerin Society, and the Chicago School.
The left is equally stuck in the Progressive Era and New Deal.
Both sides speak disparagingly of current economics. The right
prefers economics as it was prior to the rise of robust, testable, and
usable models of imperfect competition. By contrast, some on the left
would reject economics altogether—often because they incorrectly
equate an anti-enforcement bias with the use of economics itself.
They forget that the Progressives were highly creative and forwardlooking economic thinkers who made important contributions to the
marginalist revolution in economics, as well as behaviorism and
cultural relativism in the social sciences. By contrast, much of the
ideology of the New Brandeisians is reactionary, embracing cast-off
relics such as the Robinson–Patman Act and extreme hostility toward
vertical integration. This is a real opportunity lost : antitrust
economics needs to be brought more to the center, not abandoned.
Both extremes share a populist distrust of expertise and, in the
process, a highly selective and self-serving view of the facts.
Both sides denigrate robust market output as a measure of antitrust
welfare. Neoliberals, particularly Bork, did so by building producer
profits into their conception of consumer welfare. They could
proclaim a practice in the interest of consumer welfare even when it
harmed consumers. Decisions such as California Dental, the Actavis
dissent, American Express and Qualcomm all articulate “consumer
welfare” while approving anticompetitive practices that reduce
output and increase prices. By contrast, those on the left denigrate
output by their opposition to bigness, in the process ignoring
economies of scale and scope and even positive network effects. The
result is that extremists on both sides are harmful to consumers,
harmful to labor, which nearly always benefits from higher output,
and harmful to great numbers of small businesses.

________________________________________
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“TODAY BOTH THE ANTITRUST RIGHT AND THE
ANTITRUST LEFT ARE NOSTALGIC FOR THE PAST,
ALTHOUGH FOR DIFFERENT PARTS OF IT.”
________________________________________
Some say antitrust has become too technocratic and complex and
too tethered to arcane and data-driven economic models. Would
antitrust be better if it were simplified? Simpler rules would, of
course, overlook relevant facts, but maybe there would be fewer
mistaken applications.
Antitrust is technical, but not any more technical than, say, patent
law, products liability, medical malpractice, or corporate finance.
Antitrust seems to have more people who believe that it should not
take any real investment in learning to do it. I don’t see a lot of
people without professional training acting as forensic pathologists or
patent examiners. But in antitrust everyone wants to be an expert.
One likely reason is that everyone is aware of his or her own
economic interests and, thinking myopically, believes that antitrust is
the tool to make things better.
Nevertheless, simpler rules in some areas could improve decisionmaking. Most particularly, the rule of reason has become
unmanageable, largely because the Supreme Court has loaded all of
the proof requirements into the plaintiff’s opening case. Predatory
and strategic pricing rules have become overly technical and
complex. Merger analysis needs to be simplified and made more
reliant on structure and empirical study of individual responses to
price or cost changes. Its rules must also be less deferential to
claimed efficiencies. Coase showed us that anything that can be done
in a firm can also be accomplished by contract. Many efficiencies are
attainable by contractual alternatives, and contractual arrangements
can often be non-exclusive. Further, the bigger and more diverse is
the acquiring firm, the less it needs a further acquisition in order to
attain incremental efficiencies. Internal development or a non-
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exclusive license will usually work. As a result, welfare would be
improved by a simple but harsh rule against acquisitions of even
small firms by large digital platforms.
Focusing solely on antitrust policy and economic welfare, what
kinds of antitrust or regulatory interventions with respect to the
big digital platforms (Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Google)
would you like to see?
As noted above, we need harsher rules limiting large platform
acquisitions of smaller firms. President Biden has asked the agencies
to consider revising the Merger Guidelines, and a revision should do
two new things relevant to large digital platforms. One is coverage of
non-horizontal mergers, and the other is treatment of mergers as
exclusionary practices. Even an acquired firm with a market share of
zero (because it has not yet launched its product) is a competitive
threat that a preemptive acquisition can eliminate. One important
purpose of many large firm acquisitions today is to prevent the
acquired firms from growing into competitors. The value of an
acquisition consists of its integration value (efficiencies) and its
exclusion value. A non-exclusive license gives an acquirer
everything it needs to integrate whatever technology the firm has to
offer, but not the power to exclude.
Second, the most promising remedy for most platform practices is a
carefully drafted injunction. However, minimum market share
thresholds should be adjusted downward in networked markets with
large firms. Further, we must make more use of econometric rather
than market share methods of assessing power.
Third, even for proven dominance and unlawful exclusionary
conduct, we should avoid remedies that do unnecessary harm to
consumers, labor, and others who benefit from competitive markets.
Interoperability, such as we were able to achieve in the telephone
breakup in the 1980s and 1990s, provides a useful starting template.
The trick is to develop solutions that take full advantage of scale
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economies and network effects, but that facilitate competition inside
the network.
________________________________________
“EVEN FOR PROVEN DOMINANCE AND UNLAWFUL
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT, WE SHOULD AVOID
REMEDIES THAT DO UNNECESSARY HARM TO
CONSUMERS, LABOR, AND OTHERS WHO BENEFIT
FROM COMPETITIVE MARKETS.”
________________________________________
The popular press calls for “breakups” or “regulation,” often without
serious thought about consequences. Devising divestitures that do not
harm economic performance is very difficult. Most spinoffs do not
break up monopolies but simply transfer them to a different owner.
That would be true, for example, of a forced divesture of Google
Search from its parent company. Some structural remedies might
work,but applying them requires a clear-eyed assessment of effects.
A more promising use of spinoffs is for acquired firms or assets,
particularly those that are not yet fully integrated with the acquiring
firm. Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp come to
mind. Further, if “regulation” means ex ante control of product and
price, it would be a miserable solution for highly innovative markets
such as the large digital platforms. Among the likely outcomes would
be much less innovation, a significant reduction in economic growth,
but guaranteed and stable profit margins for the regulated firms.
Relatedly, forcing Amazon to segregate its own brand and third-party
sales would simply make the retail market less competitive. Those
arguing for segregation have simply not studied the problem
carefully. Amazon has benefitted more small businesses than it has
harmed, although the latter set is not empty. Amazon is not like the
chain store of the 1930s, which faced small firms mainly as a rival.
More than half of Amazon’s sales are made as broker for third-party
firms of all sizes. Distribution has evolved from a mainly vertical

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3972571

8

Addressing Divisions in Antitrust Policy

2021

practice to a network practice. The most obvious impact of platform
competition between Amazon’s own brands and third-party sellers is
lower prices and higher output. During the pandemic, the availability
of Amazon as a sales platform became a lifeline for thousands of
small sellers. Amazon’s vendor selection and ranking processes,
most-favored nation, and other exclusionary clauses are all
potentially anticompetitive, but these are best remedied by an
injunction.
What role should antitrust play in policy formulation in “nonantitrust” areas, such as labor and employment, climate change,
viewpoint discrimination? How, if at all, should antitrust law be
changed in light of those policy concerns?
Antitrust should not become a tool for achieving goals that belong in
other areas. It is not a substitute for climate law, labor law, civil
rights law, the First Amendment, or many other bodies of law.
On the other hand, concerns about competition can arise in nonantitrust areas. The obvious ones are intellectual property and
communications law, but there are others. The answer is not to
incorporate labor, environmental, or intellectual property concerns
into antitrust law. Rather, we should take concerns about competition
more seriously in making policy in other areas. Here, intellectual
property law is one of the worst offenders because it is so myopic
and does a particularly poor job of formulating doctrine that
accommodates concerns for competition. To the extent there is an
imbalance of power between capital and labor, and I believe there is,
labor law, employment and tax law are better routes to a solution.
Here, antitrust has the more limited goal of facilitating high output in
product markets, which also leads to a healthy labor market. Antitrust
should also become more aggressive about restraints on labor
mobility, including noncompete clauses or anti-poaching agreements.
As for climate change, antitrust cannot have a role in setting
substantive public standards. However, it can police anticompetitive
restraints that limit production or development in relevant areas.
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________________________________________
“WHILE WE COULD IMPROVE ANTITRUST POLICY BY
JETTISONING ITS ANTI-ENFORCEMENT BIAS, IP LAW
COULD PROFIT FROM A STRONGER TILT AGAINST
EXCESSIVE ENFORCEMENT.”
________________________________________
Is the relationship between antitrust policy and intellectual
property law where it should be?
The struggle between IP and antitrust is over the balance between
protection and dissemination. Information technologies have created
a stress point here because they tilt the innovation balance strongly in
favor of dissemination. Antitrust’s extreme right has not yet caught
up with this fact.
Antitrust today is in a better place than intellectual property law is. It
sympathizes with concerns about innovation, and is more realistic
about remedies that accommodate them. IP law does not repay the
favor and often treats competition as the enemy to be conquered.
While we could improve antitrust policy by jettisoning its antienforcement bias, IP law could profit from a stronger tilt against
excessive enforcement. An overly broad interpretation of patents or
copyrights can do as much damage as any privately created
monopoly. For example, pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlements
should be unlawful per se, with a small allowance for reasonably
anticipated litigation costs. Market division settlements such as the
one involving 1-800 Contacts earlier in 2021 should be dealt with
severely as well. Antitrust should have a strong role in enforcing
FRAND licensing systems, provided that market power and
anticompetitive effects requirements are met.
One trouble-prone area is information technologies, which includes
telecommunications networks, computers, autonomous vehicles, and
collateral technologies. For these systems, cooperation is critical for
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both development and dissemination. The FRAND system of
voluntary commitments to license standard-essential patents to all
users at fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms, has greatly
facilitated the development of networks within a competitive
environment. The system preserves a full range of direct and indirect
network effects that large networks can provide, and limits the
opportunities for unilateral anticompetitive behavior. Not all the
problems have been worked out, particularly those involving
royalties. Nevertheless, progress has been substantial.
________________________________________
“THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S SO-CALLED “NEW
MADISON” DOCTRINE, WHICH WOULD FORCE
ANTITRUST TRIBUNALS TO STAY OUT OF NETWORK
PATENT DISPUTES, MISUNDERSTANDS THIS PROBLEM
IN PRACTICALLY EVERY WAY THAT IT CAN BE
MISUNDERSTOOD”
________________________________________
The Trump administration’s so-called “New Madison” doctrine,
which would force antitrust tribunals to stay out of network patent
disputes, misunderstands this problem in practically every way that it
can be misunderstood. On one view, this is just a tug of war between
Republicans’ commitment to old technology patents and Democrats
to information technologies, but the New Madison doctrine extends
old technology ideas into new technology markets, where they are
seriously counterproductive. The economics literature is clear. In
markets where networking is essential, nondominant competitors
want to network, but dominant firms want to exclude, capturing
portions of the network for themselves. The problem resembles that
of the telephone network when the Justice Department engineered the
AT&T breakup four decades ago. AT&T resisted interconnection
strenuously while nondominant firms needed it. By using antitrust
law to force interconnection we were able to facilitate the emergence
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of a competitive but unified network. The Antitrust Division should
be ashamed and embarrassed about its intervention in the Ninth
Circuit’s Qualcomm litigation. The Division apparently has a short
memory about its own successes.
That does not change the fact that the FRAND system is
fundamentally contractual, and antitrust law has no place in simple
contract disputes. But when power, exclusion, and higher prices are
all present, as they were in the Qualcomm case, then antitrust should
have a powerful role. Here, the FTC and the Justice Department need
to get on the same page.
What do you think about President Biden’s recent Executive
Order on promotion of competition?
The Executive Order is a very helpful and positive document as long
as readers understand that it is not all about antitrust. Indeed, the
Order’s only statement about the scope of antitrust is this quotation
from the Supreme Court, observing that the Sherman Act “rests on
the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at
the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.”
(Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (Black,
j.))
That states the correct balance. For antitrust, the principal concerns
are the classic economic ones of maintaining competitive markets
that achieve low prices, high output and quality, and high rates of
innovation—but always in an environment conducive to preserving
our political and social institutions. In non-antitrust areas, its
principal role is to stay out of the way while interdicting
anticompetitive practices within its reach. For example, antitrust has
no role in setting environmental standards, but it can intervene when
firms collude to suppress research in an environmentally sensitive
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area. Likewise, antitrust law does not make labor or employment
policy directly, but it can intervene when anticompetitive agreements
limit wages or worker mobility.
________________________________________
“PRESIDENT
BIDEN’S
EXECUTIVE
ORDER
ON
COMPETITION STATES THE CORRECT BALANCE. FOR
ANTITRUST, THE PRINCIPAL CONCERNS ARE THE
CLASSIC
ECONOMIC
ONES
OF
MAINTAINING
COMPETITIVE MARKETS THAT ACHIEVE LOW PRICES,
HIGH OUTPUT AND QUALITY, AND HIGH RATES OF
INNOVATION—BUT ALL IN AN ENVIRONMENT
CONDUCIVE TO PRESERVING OUR POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.”
________________________________________
Second, while the Executive Order was touted as a “progressive”
document, I do not read it that way. It never speaks of turning the
antitrust laws into some alternative tool for regulating the
environment, civil rights, or labor. Nor does it suggest that antitrust
should abandon economic concerns or break up big digital firms
simply because they are too large. To the contrary, antitrust concerns
are expressed in the quotation above from the Supreme Court. What
the Executive Order does do, however, is urge that considerations for
competition be addressed in non-antitrust areas. For example, while
“right to repair” is not an antitrust doctrine, it is related to a variety of
post-sale restraints on consumers’ use of their own products. Control
of these comes from a number of areas, such as patent exhaustion and
misuse, fair use of copyrighted software, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, as well as antitrust.
Third, the Executive Order expresses concern that monopoly power
is growing. I agree but am unclear why the Order relied exclusively
on evidence about market concentration based on census data. Most
of the new literature on this question uses tools of direct
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measurement, determining the existence of monopoly power by
assessing margins between price and cost. These measurements are
more accurate, particularly where market boundaries are uncertain.
Ultimately, however, the methodologies reach similar conclusions :
since the 1980s the amount of market power in the economy has been
growing and most of the benefits have gone to capital. By contrast,
the rate of labor participation is much smaller than it used to be.
These are macro conclusions and are rarely relevant in any particular
antitrust case. However, they can tell us something at the more
atmospheric level about whether antitrust enforcement is adequate.
________________________________________
“[BIDEN’S] EXECUTIVE ORDER EXPRESSES CONCERN
THAT MONOPOLY POWER IS GROWING. I AGREE BUT
AM UNCLEAR WHY THE ORDER RELIED SO HEAVILY
ON EVIDENCE ABOUT MARKET CONCENTRATION
BASED ON CENSUS DATA.”
________________________________________
The Executive Order would reinvigorate a concept of net neutrality
that may result in common carrier obligations or something similar
on internet providers. This issue has been a regulatory volleyball for
some time, and this very likely represents the fact that Democrats are
once again in power. One argument made by some opponents is
categorically wrong : the idea that antitrust law is sufficient to
intervene if an internet company unilaterally cuts off or discriminates
against particular users. In its current state, the antitrust law of refusal
to deal is simply not up to this task.
The Order also recommends that the Secretary of Agriculture reboot
the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA). That statute has fallen into
disuse, mainly because the courts have incorrectly read into it a
competitive effects requirement that is not present in the relevant
parts of the statute. The PSA is not an antitrust law. Enforcement,
which is mainly by the Department of Agriculture, could enable
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smaller producers to obtain leverage against tortious business
practices such as systematic under-weighing, by large purchasers.
But these rarely present antitrust issues.
How would you compare teaching at Wharton with teaching at
the Law School ? Which do you prefer?
I obtained my first joint appointment with an excellent business
school fairly late in my career, and it has been both a dream job and a
real eye-opener. At Wharton, I teach mainly very smart
undergraduates, nearly all of whom are majoring in economics. I also
use a modified business school “case study” approach whose
readings consist of packets that combine judicial decisions, excerpts
from economics journals, and also from history, social science or
other sources. I believe this has enriched my law teaching as well. In
law, we are often overly wed to case law. All of the leading antitrust
casebooks including my own are dominated by appellate judicial
decisions with some notes from other disciplines. This is a place
where legal education could learn something from the business
school approach. On the other side, business students are not
accustomed to reading and analyzing judicial decisions; rather, they
“read about” them. Legal education should not go that far.
What advice do you have for a young academic now entering the
field of antitrust teaching and scholarship?
If you are able, get a PhD. For antitrust teachers, a PhD in economics
is an obvious choice, but it is not the only one. Good PhD programs
teach a variety of scholarly methodologies, all of which can be
valuable, and require students to produce at least one publishable
work under supervision. These programs go far beyond what even
the better law schools offer. The typical JD graduate, even with a few
years of clerking and practice, has relatively little training as a
scholar ; this tends to give PhD-holding candidates an advantage at
the front end.
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I also recommend against an SJD or a PhD in law. One important
advantage of PhDs in non-law subjects such as economics, history,
philosophy, or social science is that they expose people to alternative
disciplines and methodologies, and they will carry this through their
careers. It also enriches the study of law.
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